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This dissertation investigates the impact of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing 
and exit financing on the resolution of corporate bankruptcy. In order to accomplish 
the objective this study uses a large sample of bankrupt firms that filed for chapter 
11 in the United States over the period 1998-2009. 
The analysis shows that the presence of post-petition financing is associated with 
an improvement of the odds of reorganization, with successful emergence from 
bankruptcy and an increase of the time spent in bankruptcy, effectively buying time 
to negotiate a successful restructuring. It also studies the effect on corporate 
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In the United States of America, when financially distressed companies go 
bankrupt, they can either be liquidated, under Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code 
(and the cash generated by the sale of its assets used to pay the creditors’ claims), 
or a petition to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code can be filed 
either by the company or by the creditors on whose debt it defaulted. 
In order to keep operating as a going concern and to be able to successfully 
reorganize a firm needs money. To have money, a firm can either sell assets or 
borrow money. Selling assets may not be a viable option so a firm needs a means 
to secure credit in order to survive, but who would lend to a bankrupt firm? 
The set of laws that regulates bankruptcies in the United States, the 
bankruptcy code, has an answer to this question, the so called Debtor-in-
possession financing, which has its origins in a device created by courts, called 
“receiver’s certificate”. These certificates gave a special priority, sometimes over 
senior claimants, to investors who granted fresh loans to distressed companies. It 
was widely used to reorganize distressed railroad companies in the XIX century. 
This enabled the railroad companies to raise money for operating expenses during 
the reorganization process.     
Debtor-in-possession (DIP)  financing is therefore a unique form of financing 
that is available to financially distressed firms filling a petition to reorganize under 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy code. The legal provisions confer superior 
seniority on this financing and enhanced security to the DIP creditor as an 
incentive to lend to a firm that otherwise would not be able to attract financing, due 
to its distressed situation. 
The DIP financing is subject to formal court approval and is governed by 
section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Exit financing is another form of post petition financing, that is granted to the 
bankrupt firm to ease its way out of bankruptcy, usually to provide working capital 
and funds, either to replace the existing DIP financing, pay creditor’s claims under 
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the plan or to fund their ongoing operations after bankruptcy while the firm does not 
achieve “cruising speed”. The availability of adequate exit financing is often a 
condition to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 
Once the plan of reorganization is approved by the bankruptcy court, the 
firm is allowed to emerge from bankruptcy. 
Several research and papers have been written covering bankruptcy and 
default. Some papers describe the process and analyze the probability of a healthy 
firm defaulting, like Merton (1974) where the credit risk of a company is calculated 
by characterizing the company's equity as a call option on its assets. Put-call parity 
is then used to price the value of a put and this is treated as an analogous 
representation of the firm's credit risk. Altman (1968) calculates the probability of a 
firm defaulting by observing a mix of ratios and market value, computing the so-
called Z-score. Several papers have also been written covering the subject of DIP 
financing and its relevance in the bankruptcy process, Chaterjee, Dhillon and 
Ramirez (2004) perform event studies, analyzing the impact of DIP financing in the 
firm’s stock and bond prices. Other researchers, like Dahiya, John, Puri and 
Ramirez (2003) and Carapeto (2003), investigate the impact of DIP financing in 
APD1 and stock and bond holders recovery rates. 
The original contribution of this work is threefold, the time period analyzed, 
the methodology employed and the original research questions answered. 
Furthermore, it is one of the few that analyzes exit financing as well as DIP 
financing, 
This work is much in line with Carapeto (2008), as the research started out 
as a joint paper with Prof. Carapeto, being afterwards finished with the present 
layout, research questions and methodology. 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the impact of debtor-
in-possession (DIP) financing and exit financing on the resolution of corporate 
                                               
1
Absolute Priority Deviations (APD) refers to deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule. In the 
liquidation of a company, the absolute priority rule states that holders of secured debt must be paid 
before holders of unsecured debt. Holders of unsecured debt have precedence over preferred 
shareholders, and, finally, preferred shareholders must be satisfied before common shareholders. 
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bankruptcy. In order to accomplish this objective the study will use a large sample 
of bankrupt firms that filed for Chapter 11 in the US over the period 1998-2009. 
The most relevant issues dealt with in this thesis have to do with post-
petition financing (DIP and exit) and its relationship with the bankruptcy outcome, 
with corporate governance, classification of DIP financing according to its purpose, 
i.e. “Loan-oriented” DIP financing or “Loan-and-control” DIP financing as argued by 
Skeel (2004) and the contribution of post-petition financing to the bankruptcy 
process efficiency. 
 
The research questions are as follows: 
 
Does the presence of DIP financing and/or exit financing, 
 Improve the chances of successful reorganisation? 
 Improve corporate governance by prompting top management turnover? 
 Promote efficiency by quickly reorganizing firms with their independence 
preserved or facilitating acquisitions? 
 Do the identities of the DIP/EXIT financers make a difference on any of 
these dimensions? 
 
The initial sample comprised 1,876 publicly traded companies with total 
assets of over $ 100 million (the database does not cover smaller firms) that were 
in bankruptcy proceedings between the 1st January 1998 and the 31st December 
2009. Subsequently, companies that have failed to complete their bankruptcy 
process by the end of the sample period were excluded from the initial sample, as 
well as banks, insurance companies, companies whose financial data could not be 
confirmed and asbestos related bankruptcy filings, which are very specific and 
used by firms to go through the payment of large compensations. Major outliers 
were also removed for statistical robustness sake. The final sample is composed of 
174 companies. 
This thesis is organized as follows. In section 2 a review of the existing 
research covering this subjects is presented, in section 3 I describe the data, its 
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sources and the methodology employed, section 4 comprehends the empirical 
analysis, in section 5 the relationship between post-petition financing and value 
creation to the stakeholders is debated and in the section 6, the conclusions are 
presented. Section 7 is a small annex explaining the United States bankruptcy 
codes’ main definitions and section 8 contains a large table describing the 
correlations between all the variables involved in the univariate and multivariate 
analysis. Finally, in section 9 there are the detailed references of the works 
mentioned in this thesis. 
 
2. Literature review 
In this section I go through the major existing research about the subjects 
covered in this thesis. 
The dynamics of bankruptcy procedures are very interesting for there are 
several stakeholders, with different, often colliding motivations. 
Here one can see agency costs 2  taking effect in the conflict between 
management, shareholders and bondholders, on the event of a Chapter 11 filing. 
The bondholders, banks and other creditors want to prevent the erosion of 
the firm’s assets value, and liquidate as soon as possible, if that enables them to 
receive the most of their investment back. 
The shareholders want to maximize the firm’s value, on the hope of 
receiving something as otherwise, if the firm is liquidated, they are the last ones on 
the pecking order of the claims hierarchy, according to Absolute Priority Rules, and 
usually receive nothing. The managers want to keep their jobs, so do the 
employees, as they fare better off if the firm is not liquidated. So in spite of the 
erosion of the firm’s assets value they usually stand for non liquidating solutions. 
 
 The major questions concerning DIP financing are: 
                                               
2
 Agency costs can be defined as the typical problems that arise from conflicting motivations 
between management, shareholders and bondholders or other firm agents The information 
asymmetry that exists between shareholders and the CEO is generally considered to be a classic 
example of a principal–agent problem. The agent (the manager) is working on behalf of the 
principal (the shareholders), who does not observe the actions, or many of the actions, or is not 
aware of the repercussions of many of the actions of the agent.  
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 Does DIP financing create or destroy value? 
 Does DIP financing lead to systematic overinvestment? 
 Does DIP financing lead to higher absolute priority deviations? 
 Does DIP financing improve corporate governance? 
 Does DIP loan size matter? 
 Does DIP financing add efficiency in the restructuring process? 
 Is DIP financing used by creditors to improve their pré-petition claims, or as 
a “step in the door” way to end up acquiring the bankrupt’s firm assets at a 
cheap price? 
 
To a secured creditor, on the event of bankruptcy, quick liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets would seem to be the way to go to maximize his claims fulfillment, 
before the assets become too burdened and little value remains to split between all 
the secured claimants. 
 On the other hand, if the debtor is allowed to continue as a going concern 
and invest in positive NPV projects, successful emergence and escape from 
financial distress would allow for integral fulfillment of the creditors’ claims. 
This tradeoff is the dilemma creditor’s face, with yet another detail: if they 
lend more money to the bankrupt firm, they might be able to improve their pre-
petition claims as often courts allow for priming liens3and increased seniority of 
pre-petition loans to DIP or exit lenders. 
Thus it is not clear that DIP financing leads to value creation. Carapeto 
(2003), who has done seminal work in this area, argues that DIP financing adds 
value, by concluding that DIP loans are associated with a greater probability of 
successful reorganizations. This conclusion is derived on the results of two logistic 
models that access the probability of a firm successfully emerging from bankruptcy. 
Carapeto (1998) also concludes that the size of the new loan matters since the 
relative size of the DIP loan is shown to have a positive impact on recovery rates. 
                                               
3
 Lien priming is when a DIP lender is put ahead or at the same level of a preexisting lien. 
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 Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner (2010), identify the increasing 
importance of DIP financing and KERP 4  (Key employee retention plans) in 
bankruptcies, as the major drivers in the decline of APD (Absolute priority 
deviations) and time spent in bankruptcy, in a before 1990 versus 1991-2005 
period analysis. On this study they conclude that the U.S. bankruptcy system, that 
has long been viewed as debtor friendly, with frequent deviations of absolute 
priority in favor of the equity holders, has increasingly become creditor friendly, 
over the years, with less absolute priority deviations. 
It is argued that DIP financing leads to excessive investment in risky, (even 
negative net present value) projects, as management assumes an “all in, do or die” 
attitude, to maintain their jobs and avoid liquidation. Pomykala (1997) argues that 
bankrupt firms’ management tends to embark on inefficient investment decisions, 
on behalf of the shareholders, who usually do not receive anything for their claims, 
on the event of liquidation, therefore eroding the overall value of the bankrupt firm 
assets. 
Cornell, Longstaf and Schwartz (1996) support the idea that DIP financing 
destroys value, in a distressed real estate context and that mortgage lenders, can 
be worse off, if the owner has access to new financing and continues to meet the 
debt service. Wruck (1990) notes that earlier default preserves value when the 
alternative is persistent erosion of worth. 
On the other hand, other researchers argue that DIP financing creates 
value, allowing for the survival of positive NPV pursuing firms. Dahiya, John, Puri 
and Ramirez (2003) make an empirical analysis and find that DIP financing does 
not lead to systematic overinvestment. Firms receiving DIP financing are more 
likely to emerge successfully and on average, spend a shorter time in bankruptcy 
reorganization than the firms that do not receive such financing. Therefore they 
                                               
4
 Key Employee Retention Plan (KERP) refers to a benefit plan employed by a debtor company in 
bankruptcy cases as incentives to upper management to continue working for the company 
throughout the bankruptcy. The purpose of this KERP is to aid in the retention of certain key 
qualified and competent executives of the company and its subsidiaries, by providing a retention 
bonus for such employees in consideration of their continued employment pending the restructuring 
of the company in bankruptcy. 
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conclude DIP financing has a positive role, which is strengthened when there is a 
prior lending relationship between the creditor and the debtor.  
To reach these conclusions they first note that previous lenders differ from 
new lenders on two counts: Previous lenders are more prone to be in the 
possession of private information about the firm and previous lenders already have 
an outstanding debt claim with the firm. They examined the implication of these 
features by estimating two probit regressions using a dummy variable equal to one 
if the company obtained a DIP loan from one of its prior lenders and 0 otherwise as 
well as variables for size, leverage and industry sector. To sum up, they concluded 
that smaller firms tend to obtain DIP financing from their previous lenders. This 
being consistent with the view that the competitive advantage pre-petition lenders 
have due to private information in their possession gives them a comparative 
advantage in providing DIP financing to smaller, more information sensitive firms. 
In addition Dahiya, John, Puri and Ramirez (2003) also argue that access to 
DIP financing is an important factor in successful reorganization. The availability of 
DIP financing is particularly important to firms in desperate need of fresh working 
capital, such as retailers whose suppliers might otherwise discontinue business. 
They show that the probability of emerging as a reorganized entity is higher for 
firms receiving DIP financing. 
The benefits of DIP financing are further documented by Chaterjee, Dhillon 
and Ramirez (2004), who report abnormal stock and bond returns at the 
announcement of DIP loans. 
Similar event studies on stock price reactions to DIP announcements were 
performed by other researchers like Dhillon, Noe, and Ramírez (1996), and Elayan 
and Meyer (2001) the results being that markets tend to react positively. 
Concerning corporate governance in bankrupt firms, Gilson (1989) 
concludes that bank financers are frequently responsible for management changes 
and Skeel (2004) states that DIP lenders have been using their leverage to 
promote changes in management: “when there is management turnover shortly 
before a company files for bankruptcy, this is often because the lenders have been 
pulling their strings.” Carapeto (2008) reaches the conclusion that DIP firms show 
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higher CEO turnover: “The paper finds evidence of larger management turnover in 
DIP firms. Moreover, changes in top management are shown to have a positive 
impact on secured creditors’ recovery rates.” 
The use of DIP financing as a means to improve pre-petition loans, increase 
seniority and take control of a firm bypassing pre-Chapter 11 more senior 
claimants and thus getting the firm’s assets at a cheaper price is debated by Skeel 
(2004) and Glaun (2007). Skeel (2004) argues that through the use of covenants in 
the DIP loan agreement, like including one or more affirmative covenants with 
explicit drop dead dates “…When FAO Schwarz filed for bankruptcy in 2002, one 
of the covenants authorized the lenders to insist that the toy chain be liquidated 
unless it either sold all of its assets or confirmed a reorganization plan by April 4, 
2002. In effect, the loan agreement served as a guillotine, giving the debtor’s 
managers one limited chance to restructure the company.” 
Skeel (2004) and Carapeto (2008) point out that acquisition in bankruptcy is 
especially common in DIP firms, being a better alternative, in terms of value 
creation, for the stakeholders, than liquidation for it often leads to better recovery 
rates and less absolute priority deviations. 
To sum up, there is more to DIP financing than meets the eye. In many 
cases, the DIP lender is doing much more than simply providing financing. The 
loan agreements may double up as a mechanism for transferring control, usually to 
the DIP lender itself, like Skeel (2004) illustrates in the following passage “…When 
TWA filed for bankruptcy for the last time, American Airline provided financing 
under a DIP loan agreement that required an auction of TWA’s assets with 
American Airlines as the expected buyer. The buyer effectively was determined 
before the debtor ever filed for bankruptcy. The principal purpose of the bankruptcy 
in TWA, as with many asset sales, was to ensure that American Airlines could 
purchase the assets free and clear of any existing or future claims, and to eliminate 
the claims of TWA’s unsecured creditors.” 
When it comes to efficiency Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner (2010) 
also conclude that DIP financing gives a positive contribution to efficient 
restructuring with less Absolute Priority Deviations. 
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In what concerns exit financing and its influence in bankruptcy resolution 
few research can be found, apart from Skeel’s (2004) work. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
This section presents the data and methodology and provides some data 
analysis of the samples used in this study. 
Values are always in millions of United States Dollars, unless otherwise 
specified. 
 
3.1. Data sources 
Data was obtained from various sources, namely Bankruptcy.com database, 
Thomson Reuters Westlaw, Bloomberg  and financial fillings (8-K, 10-K, 10-Q and 
Chapter 11 filings.), using the following procedure: 
Firstly a list of United States incorporated publicly traded companies, with 
assets over 100 billion dollars, that filled chapter 11, from 01/01/1998 until 
31/12/2009, was obtained from the bankruptcy.com site free database. This 
sample comprised 1876 companies. 
Secondly, using Thomson Reuters Westlaw database whose access was 
kindly provided by Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics, a search 
was performed by company name, to locate chapter 11 filing documents, 
financials, news and court decision documents. Some companies were eliminated 
from the list due to their specific cases, lack of data and industry sector. The 
remaining sample comprised 331 companies 
Thirdly, using Bloomberg and the available S.E.C. fillings, the companies 
missing financials could be obtained for 208 firms. This sample was further 
reduced to 174 firms due to the removal of above percentile 95 and below 
percentile 5 outliers, for statistical robustness sake. Firms belonging to state 
regulated industrial sectors, like financial companies and utilities, were removed as 
well. 
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The DIP and exit loan amounts and bankruptcy outcomes were obtained 
from Thomson Westlaw, Bloomberg news and online financial press. 
Finally, Professor Lynn M. Lopuski’s database5 was used to cross reference 
and validate the final figures. Professor Lopuski is a notorious American Law & 
Economics researcher and maintains a very extensive online database on 
American bankruptcies and freely provides it to academic researchers.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
In order to investigate the answers to the research questions, collected data 
from the companies was sorted and submitted to univariate and multivariate 
analysis. 
The former analysis consists in calculating the most relevant statistics and 
investigating the relationships between them, namely the means and median of the 
several ratios and financials involved so that some comparative analysis could be 
performed, some outliers identified and preliminary conclusions could be obtained. 
A correlation table6 was also made to investigate the relationship between 
the variables and identify eventual multicolinearity issues that could arise in the 
regression analysis to follow. 
The multivariate analysis consists of 4 linear regressions that investigate the 
influence of several specific variables deemed relevant in the research on the time 
spent in bankruptcy and 8 binomial models that are estimated in an attempt to 
explain the influence of the several variables in the probability of successful 
emergence, probability of being merged or acquired while in bankruptcy and last, 
but not least, the odds of management restructuring. 
All the statistical work was performed using Microsoft Excel and Cram’s R.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
In this section, data is detailed and the results are presented. 
 
 




 See annex II 
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4.1 Univariate analysis 
Bankruptcy outcomes were classified in three classes: firms that 
successfully reorganize with their Independence preserved are classified as 
Reorganized, firms that are acquired or merged, are classified as Acquired/Merged 
and firms that end up being liquidated in Chapter 11 or converted into Chapter 7 
liquidations are classified as Liquidated.  
Table I describes the time-series distribution of bankruptcies by filling date 
for the sample of 174 Chapter 11s over the period January 1998 to December 
2009. The sample comprises 174 companies classified by type of bankruptcy 
outcome Reorganized, Merged/acquired in bankruptcy and Liquidated in 
bankruptcy. The table also shows the average number of months spent in 
bankruptcy by firms filing for Chapter 11, in each year. 
 
Merged/ Total Average time
Acquired fil ings  (in months)
1998 13 10 2 1 109 22
1999 30 18 8 4 151 16
2000 31 27 2 2 232 17
2001 37 31 6 0 384 15
2002 15 9 4 2 293 13
2003 13 9 3 1 210 23
2004 7 7 0 0 114 17
2005 13 12 1 0 100 15
2006 9 7 2 0 78 10
2007 3 3 0 0 100 6
2008 2 2 0 0 238 4
2009 1 0 1 0 256 8
Total 174 135 29 10 2265 16
Table I: Bankruptcy outcomes per year
Year # companies Reorganized Liquidated
 
The average time spent in bankruptcy has been diminishing, over the years. 
This conclusion is in line with Bharath, Panshapegesan and Werner (2010) who 
attribute this increase in the efficiency of the process to the increasing importance 
of DIP financing and KERP, over the years, in the bankruptcy process. 
Master Thesis| Bankruptcy resolution: An empirical study on post-petition financing and governance 
Pedro Santos Ferreira                                                                                                                       12 
Table II compares the average time spent in bankruptcy and the median 
number of months, according to the outcome.  
 
Outcome #firms % Mean Median
Reorganized 135 78% 14 11
Merged/Acquired 29 17% 22 17
Liquidated 10 6% 19 13
Total 174 100% 16 12
Table II: Time spent in Chapter 11 (months)
 
 
Firms that end up being merged or acquired, on average spent more time in 
bankruptcy (22 months), which is consistent with the fact that longer negotiation 
processes may be required until emergence. Whereas firms that successfully 
reorganize spent on average 14 months in bankruptcy and finally firms that ended 
up being liquidated spent on average 19 months in bankruptcy. 
Table III compares the average time spent in bankruptcy, according to the 
outcome and the fact that there was DIP or exit finance, against the time spent by 
the firms where there was none of these financings. 
 
Table III: Average time(months)
DIP Exit DIP/EXIT Others
Reorganized 14 11 14 12
Merger/Acquired 26 25 24 11
Liquidated 21 0 21 16  
 
Surprisingly, firms with post-petition financing (Dip or exit financing) on 
average spent more time in bankruptcy, regardless of the outcome, which differs 
from the conclusions reached by Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner (2010). 
The reason behind this may be the extra time needed to reach a consensus 
between all the claimants and ensure the court’s approval for the new loan. 
Table IV shows that firms with DIP and/or EXIT financing are more prone to 
promote CEO turnover, perfectly corroborating Skeel (2004) and Carapeto (2008) 
conclusions. Of all CEO turnover cases, 90% were from firms that either had DIP 
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or exit financing, with only 10% being from firms that received neither of these 
financings. 
 
Table IV: DIP EXIT DIP OR EXIT non DIP neither DIP nor EXIT
CEO turnover 75% 67% 90% 25% 10%  
 
Table V, analyses some characteristics of Chapter 11 outcomes. We can 
see that the presence of DIP or exit financing does not seem to be a relevant factor 
in what concerns mergers and acquisitions, as the percentage of firms that receive 
these post-petition financings and are subsequently merged or acquired does not 
differ much from the ones that are merged or acquired without receiving this 
financings, contrary to what Skeel (2004) and Carapeto (2008) argue. 
 
Table V: Chapter 11 outcomes
Caracteristics M&A Liquidation Reorganized
DIP 16.2% 5.4% 78.5%
EXIT 17% 0% 83%
DIP or EXIT 16% 5% 79%
non DIP 18% 7% 75%
neither DIP nor EXIT 19% 14% 67%  
 
Clearly, successful reorganization is achieved by a larger percentage of 
firms when they are granted DIP or exit financing, and a smaller percentage of 
them end up being liquidated, as opposed to the higher percentage of liquidations 
found when the firms do not receive either of these financings. 
Other interesting fact observed and detailed in table VI is that of the firms 
that received DIP financing, 43% of them received it from previous pre-petition 
lenders. Moreover 67% of the firms that received DIP financing managed to 
receive exit financing afterwards and 40% of these firms received the exit loans 
from former DIP lenders. In turn, the percentage of EXIT loans that were granted 
by previous pre-petition lenders was 30%. 
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Table VI:  
EXIT from Previous 
EXIT DIP lenders lender
DIP 67% 40% 43%
EXIT 30%
and post-petition lenders
Relathionship between previous 
 
 
These figures validate the “Loan-oriented” argument that pre-petition 
lenders have an incentive to grant DIP financing, to maintain or improve their 
overall claims over the firm´s assets and that the exit financing follows similar 
dynamics. 
Finally, on table VII, the firm´s sample is characterized by their industry 
sector and the main statistics of their financial ratios, namely the mean and median 
so that we can see broadly how the sample is composed. 
 
Table VII: Firms caracteristics
Financial ratios Mean Median Industry sector (Bloomberg ICS) # Firms %
Total l iabilities 951.92 555.88 Basic materials 13 7%
Total Assets 1031.09 544.49 Industrial 26 15%
Income (operating) -19.43 -5.53 Communications 36 21%
Income/Total Assets -0.03 -0.01 Consumer, Cyclical 53 30%
Current Ratio 1.20 1.03 Consumer, Non-Cyclical 36 21%
Net Debt 551.17 334.35 Financial 0 0%
DIP amount 99.68 41.00 Technology 5 3%
EXIT amount 124.10 35.00 Utilities 0 0%
Net-income -110.08 -25.99 Energy 5 3%
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4.2. Multivariate analysis 
The multivariate analysis is based in a battery of regressions that can be 
separated in two large groups. 
In the first group, we run regressions with the natural logarithm of the time 
spent in bankruptcy as the explained variable and the financial ratios and relevant 
dummy variables as explanatory variables. 
In the second group binomial models are estimated in an attempt to explain 
the influence of the several variables in the probability of successful emergence, 
probability of being merged or acquired while in bankruptcy, and last the odds of 
management restructuring. 
The variables are as follows: 
 
• Time = Natural logarithm of the number of days spent in bankruptcy. The 
logarithm was used to smooth the data and normalize the residuals. 
 
• Plans = Number of plans submitted to the bankruptcy court is supposed to 
proxy the overall degree of disagreement amongst all classes of claimants 
at the negotiation table (see Carapeto, [2005]). This coefficient should be 
positively related with time and negatively related with successful 
bankruptcy outcomes. 
 
• Prepackaged = A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the plan of 
emergence was pre-packaged o otherwise as in Carapeto (2005), is used to 
see if it matters. A pre-packaged bankruptcy is when a reorganization plan 
has already been negotiated with the creditors before filing for bankruptcy. 
 
• Size = Natural logarithm of total liabilities will be used as a proxy for firm 
size. The coefficient is expected to have a positive sign as the complexity of 
the bargaining increases with the firm size (see Weiss [1990], Franks and 
Torous [1994] and Carapeto [1998]). 
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• CEO Turnover = A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in case of 
Chief Executive Officer turnover after filing for Chapter 11 and 0 otherwise. 
Should have a positive coefficient. Gilson (1989) argues that bank lenders 
frequently try to force management changes in financially distressed 
companies 7 . The management turnover is expected to have a positive 
impact. 
 
• Economic distress= Degree of Economic Distress: Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998), Carapeto (1998) and Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramírez (1996) use 
profit margin as a measure of economic strength of a firm. While firms with 
negative operating income (EBITDA) may be both economically and 
financially distressed, hence with less wealth to distribute to all claimants, 
firms without negative economic shocks should have suffered much lower 
value depletion and so they should be in better shape. This fact suggests 
that the Income-to-Assets ratio measured at year-end prior to filing for 
bankruptcy should be negatively related to the time spent in bankruptcy and 
positively related to the odds of successful outcomes. 
 
• DIP = A dummy variable that takes the value of one if there was DIP 
financing and 0 otherwise is used to see if its presence matters, as in 
Carapeto (1998) 
 
• EXIT = A dummy variable that takes the value of one if there was exit 
financing and 0 otherwise is used to see if its presence is relevant. 
 
• DIP/Liabilities = The size of DIP financing matters since small loans would 
not make much of a difference (see Adams [1995] and Carapeto [1998]). In 
this way the DIP financing-to-liabilities ratio should have a negative effect on 
the time spent in bankruptcy and a positive effect on the odds of successful 
emergence/reorganization. 
                                               
7
 Earlier this year, Portuguese newspaper Público published that Pescanova’s creditor banks were 
available to discuss the company’s debt restructuring as long as the company´s CEO resigned. 
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• EXIT/Liabilities = Exit financing-to-liabilities ratio is expected to have an 
effect, in line with the DIP/Liabilities variable. 
 
• Liquidity = The current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) will be used 
as a proxy for liquidity, since more liquid firms should have lower uncertainty 
surrounding the valuation of their assets, thus giving stakeholders better 
prospects of fulfilling their claims. So the current ratio measured at year-end 
prior to filing for bankruptcy should have a negative association with the time 
spent in bankruptcy and a positive association with the odds of successful 
emergence/reorganization. 
 
• Financial distress= Degree of Financial Distress and Insolvency. The 
Liabilities-to-assets ratio measured at year-end prior to filing for bankruptcy 
is used to assess the degree of financial distress and solvency as in 
Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramírez (1996) and Carapeto (2003). It is expected 
that the higher the leverage the smaller the assets to distribute to everyone, 
hence, more time spent before emergence. 
 
 DIP previous lender = A dummy variable that takes the value of one if at 
least one of the DIP financers is a previous lender of the firm and 0 
otherwise. Is used to see if its presence is relevant. 
 
 EXIT previous lender= A dummy variable that takes the value of one if at 
least one of the exit financers is a previous lender of the firm and 0 
otherwise. Is used to see if its presence is relevant. 
 
• PostPetition = A dummy variable that takes the value of one if there was 
either DIP or exit financing and 0 otherwise is used to see if the presence of 
post-petition financing presence matters. 
• Post/Liabilities = The ratio between the post-petition financing amount and 
total liabilities. In line with DIP/Liabilities and EXIT/Liabilities. 
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Merger or acquisition of a firm is a good value preservation alternative to 
liquidation for it often leads to better recovery rates and less absolute priority 
deviations. This is pointed out by Skeel (2004) and Carapeto (2008), as they 
observe that acquisition in bankruptcy is especially common in DIP firms and 
usually it is a better alternative, in terms of value creation, for all the stakeholders, 
since it leads to the continuation of the firms going concern.  
Keeping this in mind, a fourth class of outcome from bankruptcy was 
computed, the Successful emergence. It encompasses the Reorganized and 
Merged/Acquired results so that a larger spectrum of tests could be performed 
within the regressions,  
There was a need to run three different linear regressions, one to test the 
influence of the simultaneous presence of DIP and exit financing and their 
amounts, another to test the sole presence of DIP financing and finally one 
isolating the influence of exit financing. The other changes in variables between 
linear models I, II and III has to do with preventing the simultaneous presence of 
variables with a significant degree of correlation, in order to eliminate 
multicolinearity since some of the independent variables have a high degree of 
correlation between them. Nevertheless, we wished to test the effect of all the 
variables on the dependent variable.  
The models are statistically robust and were tested for autocorrelation using 
Durbin-Watson’s test and for heteroskedasticity, using the “Studentized” Breusch-
Pagan’s test. The tests results can be seen below each regression, respectively. 
 
Master Thesis| Bankruptcy resolution: An empirical study on post-petition financing and governance 
Pedro Santos Ferreira                                                                                                                       19 


























R-Squared / Adjusted R-Squared 0.1623   0.1055
Sample size 174
F-statistic: 2.854, p-value: 0.001913
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Breusch-Pagan test Durbin-Watson test
BP = 1.8853, df = 1, p-value = 0.1697 DW = 2.0986, p-value = 0.7458
Linear Model I
 
In this first linear model, I investigate the impact of the before mentioned 
variables on the time spent in bankruptcy. The F-Snedecor test indicates that the 
overall adherence of the model is good and that it has a high degree of 
significance. However the determination coefficient (R-squared) says the model 
only accounts for 16.23% of the variance in the dependent variable. As for the 
independent variables, besides the constant intercept, three of them are highly 
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significant and another one is significant with a 0.05 degree of confidence, as can 
be observed by their respective p-values. The coefficients signs are in line with 
what was expected. 
Since the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of days 
spent in bankruptcy, the independent variables coefficient represent the marginal 
percentage change in the number of days. Using the number of plans as an 
example, for each additional plan the time spent in bankruptcy increases by 13.9% 
more days, “ceteris paribus”. Naturally multiplicity of plans means there are 
disagreements between the claimants, and more time is needed to reach an 
agreement. 
The prepackaged dummy variable is also highly significant and has a 
negative coefficient, which is as expected, for prepackaged deals are negotiated 
outside the court and usually the major stakeholders have already reached an 
agreement even before the chapter 11 filing, therefore reducing the overall time 
needed to emerge from bankruptcy.  
CEO.Turnover dummy variable is also statistically significant and its sign is 
negative, which means that its presence has a negative effect on the time spent in 
bankruptcy by the firms. This can be interpreted as the new management being 
especially diligent and dynamic in negotiating a way out of bankruptcy, in 
opposition to an entrenched previous management.  
The DIP financing dummy independent variable is also significant, although 
to a minor degree of confidence, and its sign is positive, which means it matters 
and its presence increases the time spent before emergence. This can be 
interpreted as more time being spent in negotiations. This result is in line with 
Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner (2010), the coefficient assuming the same 
sign as in their OLS regression. 
The financial distress variable is significant with a lesser degree of 
confidence and its negative sign implying that more financially distressed firms 
spent less time in bankruptcy, which is contradictory to what was expected. 
However, it can be so due to the fact that more distressed firms have less time 
available to spend before managing to reach an agreement and a restructuring 
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plan, if they want to survive. Time is money and to them, since they have less 
money, time is of the essence. 
Size, economic distress, exit financing dummy variable, DIP/Liabilities, 
Exit/Liabilities and Liquidity, have no individual statistical significance, what was 
expected was that larger firms, with CEO turnover, with bigger exit loan needs and 
more liquidity, spend more time in bankruptcy, and firms that manage to get large 
DIP loans, during bankruptcy, speed up the process. 
In linear model II, a different set of variables is used. This time I exclude the 
variables concerning DIP financing while maintaining all the others. 






















R-Squared / Adjusted R-Squared 0.1538   0.1074
Sample size 174
F-statistic: 3.312, p-value: 0.0009685
Breusch-Pagan test Durbin-Watson test
BP = 0.7549, df = 1, p-value = 0.3849 DW = 2.0965, p-value = 0.7383
Linear Model II
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
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The results obtained, are very similar to the ones obtained in the linear 
model I. The number of plans, prepackaged and CEO turnover are highly 
significant. The signs of the associated coefficients are consistent with the ones 
obtained in model I. The financial distress variable is significant to a lesser degree 
of confidence, the size, economic distress,, dummy exit, exit/liabilities and liquidity 
independent variables are not statistically significant and exit finance, does not 
seem to matter in this case also. 
In the linear model III, I exclude the exit financing related independent 
variables and maintain all the others. 
Independent variables Dependent variable: TIME





















R-Squared / Adjusted R-Squared 0.1554   0.109
Sample size 174
F-statistic: 3.352, p-value: 0.0008596
Breusch-Pagan test Durbin-Watson test
BP = 2.4237, df = 1, p-value = 0.1195 DW = 2.0749, p-value = 0.6918
Linear Model III
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
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The results for most control variables are in line with the previous 
models,even though DIP related variables fail to be statistically significant. 
In the linear model IV the two previous lender dummy variables are added. 


























DIP previous lender -0.11456
(0.40226)
EXIT previous lender 0.09786
(0.53673)
R-Squared / Adjusted R-Squared 0.1679   0.1003
Sample size 174
F-statistic: 2.483, p-value: 0.004131
Breusch-Pagan test Durbin-Watson test
BP = 1.638, df = 1, p-value = 0.2006 DW = 2.0908, p-value = 0.7245
Linear Model IV
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
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DIP previous lender and EXIT previous lender dummy variables. 
Their purpose is to investigate if the identities of the DIP and exit financers 
make any difference that is if the fact that they were previous lenders of the 
bankrupt firms has any impact on the time spent in bankruptcy. 
The results are similar to the ones obtained in the linear model I, with no 
relevant explanatory value added by the new variables. 
To sum up, considering all four linear models, one can conclude that overall, 
the regressions confirm that DIP finance is relevant to the time spent in bankruptcy, 
having a positive effect on it, as well as the multiplicity of plans. The event of 
prepackaged deals is confirmed to reduce the time spent in bankruptcy, as well as 
the CEO turnover. The presence of previous lenders as DIP or exit financers was 
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Eight binomial models are estimated in an attempt to explain the influence of 
the several variables in the probability of successful emergence, probability of 
being merged or acquired while in bankruptcy, and last, but not least, the odds of 
liquidation. 
The results are presented in the following tables: 
Independent variables
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Successeful Successeful Acquired/ Liquidated
emergence emergence Merged
Constant intercept -1.5907 -1.7394 -1.49133 -0.42568
(0.4920) (0.4453) (0.3702) (0.870)
Size 0.4106 0.4455 -0.09778 -0.09756
(0.2297) (0.1795) (0.6830) (0.787)
Liquidity 0.2702 0.2240 -0.07307 -0.21720
(0.4478) (0.5239) (0.7467) (0.612)
Findistress 0.2125 0.1891 0.56412 -0.49654
(0.6671) (0.6875) (0.0609) . (0.525)
PostPetition 1.3604 1.2560 -0.33187 -1.12383
(0.0546) . (0.0599) . (0.5996) (0.171)
Post/Liabilities -0.2326 0.44036 -0.19381
(0.6452) (0.1799) (0.834)
Pseudo R-Squared / AIC 0.08 / AIC: 98.536 0.07 / AIC: 96.726 0.08 / AIC:159.6  0.05 / AIC: 85.315
Sample size 174 174 174 174
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Logit Models
Dependent variables (p-values in brackets)
Null deviance: 92.450  on 173  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 86.536  on 168  degrees of freedom
 
 
In the Logistic regressions, two new variables are used, PostPetition, that is 
a dummy variable, assuming the value of 1 if there is DIP or exit financing and zero 
otherwise and Post/Liabilities which is the ratio between the post petition financing 
amount and total liabilities. This transformation has the purpose of increasing the 
robustness of the logit models. After running the logit models I to IV, using the 
former variables DIP, Exit, DIP/Liabilities, Exit/Liabilities and running them again 
using the new PostPetition and Post/Liabilities variables it was acknowledged that 
the later models present better adherence to reality and better significance scores, 
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the result being better and less bulky models with no significant loss due to the 
transformation. Hence this variable structure was preferred in these cases, since 
the purpose was to research the impact of post-petition financing as a whole on the 
odds of successful emergence, being acquired or merged and being liquidated, 
whereas on the linear models before, the purpose was to study the individual 
contribution of each variable on the time spent in bankruptcy.  
Besides, linear models using the PostPetition and Post/Liabilities variables, 
with the specifications described above, were tested, reaching no better results 
than the ones presented, using DIP and exit independently.  
The PostPetition dummy variable has a significant positive effect on the 
odds of successful emergence and it is the only statistically significant variable in 
the first two logit models. These results confirm the conclusions reached in the 
univariate analysis. 
What distinguishes model I from model II is that in model II I excluded the 
Post/Liabilities variable, to see if there was a relevant change in the results. 
Logit model III has the purpose of investigating the factors influencing the 
merging or acquisition of a bankrupt firm. In this model, the only statistically 
significant variable is the financial distress one. It seems that the more financially 
distressed a firm is, greater are the odds of being subject to a merger or being 
acquired. The Size variable is not statistically significant, if it were, it’s negative 
coefficient makes all the sense, and could be interpreted as some firms being “too 
big to be acquired”. The same could be expected for the Liquidity variable, since 
more liquid firms restructure more easily for there is more money available to pay 
claims and buy time, although firms with a lot of available cash are appetizing 
targets for takeovers. Those were the expected results, but since the mentioned 
variables are not statistically significant, those deductions cannot be proved. 
In the logit IV model, we see that none of the independent variables is 
statistically significant. What was expected was that Post-Petition, Liquidity and 
Financial distress would be negatively correlated with the odds of a firm being 
liquidated. Size, on the other hand, was expected to have a positive effect on the 
odds of liquidation, possibly indicating that a firm with high liabilities and assets is 
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more prone to liquidation. Other variable specifications were tested, with no 
additional success. In spite of the results, this model was maintained to show the 
results and because it ended up being the best one available.  
A fifth model was built, logit model V, using the original DIP and exit 
variables instead of the PostPetition and Post/Liabilities variables used in logit 
models I to IV, to see if the results differed. In the table below we can see that they 
are very similar to the ones obtained in the logit models I and II..  
 
















Pseudo R-Squared / AIC 0.30 / AIC: 82.736
Sample size 174
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Logit Model V
Null deviance: 92.450  on 173  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 68.736  on 167  degrees of freedom
 
 
In this model the only statistically significant variable is the exit dummy 
variable, its presence having a positive effect on the odds of successful emergence 
from bankruptcy as was expected, and in line with the results where post-petition 
transformed variables were used instead. There is also an increase in this model’s 
global adherence. 
Master Thesis| Bankruptcy resolution: An empirical study on post-petition financing and governance 
Pedro Santos Ferreira                                                                                                                       28 
A sixth model, with CEO turnover as explained variable, logit model VI was 
also estimated to investigate the influence of the variables on the odds of existing 
CEO turnover in the bankrupt firms, after Chapter 11 filing. The only statistically 
significant variables are Financial distress and the exit financing dummy. Financial 
distress seems to have a negative influence on the odds of CEO turnover and the 
presence of exit finance seems to have a positive influence on the odds of CEO 
turnover. This confirms the evidence found in the univariate analysis that the 
presence of exit financing is related to increased CEO turnover, proving that the 
exit lenders may be using their influence to “pull the strings” in their favor. The 
model is as follows 
















Pseudo R-Squared / AIC 0.08 / AIC: 191.59
Sample size 174
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
Logit Model VI
Null deviance: 187.62  on 173  degrees of freedom
Residual deviance: 177.59  on 167  degrees of freedom
 
 
The DIP dummy variable was also expected to have a positive effect on the 
odds of CEO turnover, but turned out not being statistically significant in this model. 
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In the last two logit models, model VII and VIII. I extend the previous 
analysis adding the previous lenders variables, DIP previous lender and EXIT 
previous lender in order to test if they have any effect on the odds of successful 
emergence and CEO turnover. 
Logit Model VII Logit Model VIII
Independent variables Dependent variable Dependent variable
(p-values in brackets) (p-values in brackets)
Successeful emergence CEO Turnover








Financial distress 0.2702 -0.41545
(0.5741) (0.123)
DIP previous lender 1.9698 0.47037
(0.0641) . (0.259)
EXIT previous lender 0.2548 0.02133
(0.7541) (0.965)
Pseudo R-Squared / AIC 0.11 / AIC: 98.03 0.06 / AIC: 194.22
Sample size 174 174
Null deviance / degrees of freedom 92.45 on 173 187.62 on 173
Residual deviance / degrees of freedom 84.03 on 167 180.22 on 167
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1  
In logit model VII, DIP previous lender is statistically significant suggesting 
that if the DIP lender is a pre-petition previous creditor it may increase the odds of 
successful emergence. 
In logit model VIII, the DIP previous lender and exit previous lender 
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5. Limitations and further research 
It can be argued that the survival and reorganization of bankrupt firms 
allows for less value depletion than its liquidation, taking into account not only the 
creditors and shareholders, but also all the other stakeholders, like employees, 
clients, suppliers and even the communities where the firm is present. 
It is not clear that the DIP and exit lenders provide a selection of the 
bankrupt firms, only lending to those that are viable as a going concern, thus 
providing an unaccounted screening and monitoring role, for their motivations may 
also include the acquisition of the firm’s assets at cheaper prices, the improvement 
of pre-petition claims and managing to take control of the bankrupt firms.  
Often post-petition lenders also promote CEO turnover, leading to more 
sound governance. 
As mentioned in the literature review, some researchers argue that fast 
liquidation is a better option. By liquidating, assets and resources can be more 
efficiently employed elsewhere. The measurement of this tradeoff is out of the 
scope of this dissertation.  
An interesting set of questions arose from this study that I would like very 
much to investigate next. In the Portuguese context, although the legislation being 
very different, that is the following: Post petition financing allows for the survival of 
otherwise non viable firms. Is it worth it? That is, firms can fail because they do not 
have access to good financing, despite having good projects, business models and 
competent management or they fail in spite of the good models and financing 
because they have incompetent management. If the latter is correct, post-petition 
financing that prompts management turnover may solve the matter. Is the problem 
of access to credit, lack of positive NPV projects or incumbent management? I 
would like to study a sample of Portuguese insolvent firms and research the “day 
after” bankruptcy, what happened next to the firm, to the managers, and to the 
business model, analyzing also its peers. Regarding the previous managers, were 
they successful afterwards in other firms? 
The final objective of this research will be to assess what led to the 
insolvency of Portuguese firms. Can we isolate major drivers? Is it the economic 
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context? Lacking positive NPV projects? Is it good credit availability? Is it the 
management? Is it the legislation? (Portuguese bankruptcy code) or is it the 
inefficient judicial system? 
With some streamlining, this can be the seed of my doctoral research. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Although I wish the regressions were more affirmative, some broad 
conclusions can be taken allowing for some answers to the research questions to 
be reached.  
The results from the multivariate analysis when coupled with the univariate 
analysis findings and keeping in sight the previous academic research mentioned 
in the literature review leads to the conclusion that debtor-in-possession financing 
and exit financing have come to play an important role on American bankruptcies, 
a role that is positive and enhances value. 
This work shows that post-petition financing contributes positively to the 
successful emergence of bankrupt firms and is connected to a higher degree of 
CEO turnover, therefore contributing to better corporate governance. 
Post-petition financing, by improving a bankrupt firm’s chances of successful 
emergence, promotes certification, by correctly choosing firms with better 
prospects. One could argue that post-petition financing can allow for the survival of 
inefficient firms, distorting the efficiency of the free market. I do not believe this to 
be the case since bankruptcy is a lengthy, court regulated process and there are 
no free lunches, i.e. the post-petition financers usually do not grant loans to non-
viable firms. That would be bad business and in the financial markets, the first law 
is the survival of the fittest.  
A high percentage of exit financing is granted by DIP lenders and the 
percentage of DIP and exit lenders, that are previous creditors is also high, thus 
validating the Pre-petition loan claims improvement argument. 
Contrary to previous research, post-petition financing seems to be related 
with increased time spent in bankruptcy, effectively buying the firm time to reach 
successful reorganization. 
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Overall the presence of post-petition financing has a positive contribution to 
value creation as it is associated with a higher degree of successful emergence of 
bankrupt firms, with improved governance. 
 
7. Annex I 
 This explanatory annex was extracted from http\\www.uscourts.gov and 
explains the bankruptcy process in the United States and is intended to give an 
overview to the readers not familiarized with it. 
 
“Bankruptcy in the United States of America 
Bankruptcy in the United States is governed under the United States 
Constitution (Article 1, Section 8, Clause 4) which authorizes Congress to enact 
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." 
Congress has exercised this authority several times since 1801, most recently by 
adopting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, codified in Title 11 of 
the United States Code and commonly referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code" 
("Code"). The Code has been amended several times since, with the most 
significant recent changes enacted in 2005 through the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). 
 
Corporate Bankruptcy 
Federal bankruptcy laws govern how companies go out of business or 
recover from crippling debt. A bankrupt company, the "debtor," might use Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code to "reorganize" its business and try to become 
profitable again. Management continues to run the day-to-day business operations 
but all significant business decisions must be approved by a bankruptcy court.  
Under Chapter 7, the company stops all operations and goes completely out of 
business. A trustee is appointed to "liquidate" (sell) the company's assets and the 
money is used to pay off the debt, which may include debts to creditors and 
investors.  
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The investors who take the least risk are paid first. For example, secured 
creditors take less risk because the credit that they extend is usually backed by 
collateral, such as a mortgage or other assets of the company. They know they will 
get paid first if the company declares bankruptcy.  
Bondholders have a greater potential for recovering their losses than 
stockholders, because bonds represent the debt of the company and the company 
has agreed to pay bondholders interest and to return their principal. Stockholders 
own the company, and take greater risk. They could make more money if the 
company does well, but they could lose money if the company does poorly. The 
owners are last in line to be repaid if the company fails. Bankruptcy laws determine 
the order of payment.  
A company's securities may continue to trade even after the company has 
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. In most instances, companies that file under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code are generally unable to meet the listing 
standards to continue to trade on Nasdaq or the New York Stock Exchange. 
However, even when a company is delisted from one of these major stock 
exchanges, their shares may continue to trade on either the OTCBB (Over the 
counter bulletin board) or the Pink Sheets (A daily publication compiled by the 
National Quotation Bureau with bid and ask prices of over-the-counter (OTC) 
stocks, including the market makers who trade them). There is no federal law that 
prohibits trading of securities of companies in bankruptcy.  
During bankruptcy, bondholders will stop receiving interest and principal 
payments, and stockholders will stop receiving dividends. The reorganization plan 
will dictate what will happen to investor’s stakes.  
The bankruptcy court may determine that stockholders don't get anything 
because the debtor is insolvent. (A debtor's solvency is determined by the 
difference between the value of its assets and its liabilities). 
 
Chapter 11 
Most publicly-held companies will file under Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 
7 because they can still run their business and control the bankruptcy process. 
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Chapter 11 provides a process for rehabilitating the company's faltering business. 
Sometimes the company successfully works out a plan to return to profitability; 
sometimes, in the end, it liquidates. Under Chapter 11 reorganization, a company 
usually keeps doing business and its stock and bonds may continue to trade in 
securities markets. Since they still trade, the company must continue to file SEC 
reports with information about significant developments. For example, when a 
company declares bankruptcy, or has other significant corporate changes, they 
must report it within 15 days on the SEC's Form 8-K.  
 
The Automatic Stay  
The automatic stay provides a period of time in which all judgments, 
collection activities, foreclosures, and repossessions of property are suspended 
and may not be pursued by the creditors on any debt or claim that arose before the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. As with cases under other chapters of the 
Bankruptcy Code, a stay of creditor actions against the chapter 11 debtor 
automatically goes into effect when the bankruptcy petition is filed. The filing of a 
petition, however, does not operate as a stay for certain types of actions listed 
under chapter 11, section 362. The stay provides a breathing spell for the debtor, 
during which negotiations can take place to try to resolve the difficulties in the 
debtor's financial situation. 
Under specific circumstances, the secured creditor can obtain an order from 
the court granting relief from the automatic stay. For example, when the debtor has 
no equity in the property and the property is not necessary for an effective 
reorganization, the secured creditor can seek an order of the court lifting the stay to 
permit the creditor to foreclose on the property, sell it, and apply the proceeds to 
the debt. 
 
Pre-packaged Bankruptcy Plans 
Sometimes companies prepare a reorganization plan that is negotiated and 
voted on by creditors and stockholders before they actually file for bankruptcy. This 
shortens and simplifies the process, saving the company money. For example, 
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Resorts International and TWA used this method. Under the Bankruptcy Code, 
two-thirds of the stockholders who vote must accept the plan before it can be 
implemented, and dissenters will have to go along with the majority. 
 
Chapter 11 procedures 
The U.S. Trustee, the bankruptcy arm of the Justice Department, will 
appoint one or more committees to represent the interests of creditors and 
stockholders in working with the company to develop a plan of reorganization to 
get out of debt. The plan must be accepted by the creditors, bondholders, and 
stockholders, and confirmed by the court. However, even if creditors or 
stockholders vote to reject the plan, the court can disregard the vote and still 
confirm the plan if it finds that the plan treats creditors and stockholders fairly. 
Once the plan is confirmed, another more detailed report must be filed with the 
SEC on Form 8-K. This report must contain a summary of the plan, but sometimes 
a copy of the complete plan is attached.  
 
The Reorganization Plan  
The debtor has a 120-day period during which it has an exclusive right to file 
a plan. This exclusivity period may be extended or reduced by the court. But in no 
event may the exclusivity period, including all extensions, be longer than 18 
months. After the exclusivity period has expired, a creditor or the case trustee may 
file a competing plan. The U.S. trustee may not file a plan.  
A chapter 11 case may continue for many years unless the court, the U.S. 
trustee, the committee, or another party in interest acts to ensure the case's timely 
resolution. The creditors' right to file a competing plan provides incentive for the 
debtor to file a plan within the exclusivity period and acts as a check on excessive 
delay in the case. 
Committees of creditors and stockholders negotiate a plan with the 
company to relieve the company from repaying part of its debt so that the company 
can try to get back on its feet.  
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One committee that must be formed is called the "official committee of 
unsecured creditors." They represent all unsecured creditors, including 
bondholders. The "indenture trustee," often a bank hired by the company when it 
originally issued a bond, may sit on the committee.  
An additional official committee may sometimes be appointed to represent 
stockholders.  
The U.S. Trustee may appoint another committee to represent a distinct 
class of creditors, such as secured creditors, employees or subordinated 
bondholders.  
After the committees work with the company to develop a plan, the 
bankruptcy court must find that it legally complies with the Bankruptcy Code before 
the plan can be implemented. This process is known as plan confirmation and is 
usually completed in a few months.  
When a chapter 11 debtor needs operating capital, it may be able to obtain 
it from a lender by giving the lender a court-approved "superpriority" over other 
unsecured creditors or a lien on property of the estate, the so called Debtor in 
possession (DIP) financing.  
 
Steps in Development of the Plan: 
 The debtor company develops a plan with committees.  
 Company prepares a disclosure statement and reorganization plan and files 
it with the court.  
 SEC reviews the disclosure statement to be sure it's complete.  
 Creditors (and sometimes the stockholders) vote on the plan.  
 Court confirms the plan, and  
 Company carries out the plan by distributing the securities or payments 
called for by the plan.  
 
U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission role in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies 
Generally, the SEC's role is limited. The SEC will review the disclosure 
document to determine if the company is telling investors and creditors the 
Master Thesis| Bankruptcy resolution: An empirical study on post-petition financing and governance 
Pedro Santos Ferreira                                                                                                                       37 
important information they need to know; and ensure that stockholders are 
represented by an official committee, if appropriate.  
Although the SEC does not negotiate the economic terms of reorganization 
plans, it may take a position on important legal issues that will affect the rights of 
public investors in other bankruptcy cases as well. For example, the SEC may step 
in if it believes that the company's officers and directors are using the bankruptcy 
laws to shield themselves from lawsuits for securities fraud.  
 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Some companies are so far in debt or have other problems so serious that 
they can't continue their business operations. They are likely to "liquidate" and file 
under Chapter 7. Their assets are sold for cash by a court appointed trustee. 
Administrative and legal expenses are paid first, and the remainder goes to 
creditors. Secured creditors will have their collateral returned to them. If the value 
of the collateral is not sufficient to repay them in full, they will be grouped with other 
unsecured creditors for the rest of their claim. Bondholders, and other unsecured 
creditors, will be notified of the Chapter 7, and should file a claim in case there's 
money left for them to receive a payment.  
Stockholders do not have to be notified of the Chapter 7 case because they 
generally don't receive anything in return for their investment. But, in the unlikely 
event that creditors are paid in full, stockholders will be notified and given an 
opportunity to file claims. 
 
Securities and Exchange Commission most important fillings 
 
10-Q - This is a company's quarterly report. As a general rule, the 10-Q is less 
detailed than the annual report. Companies are required to file their 10-Q within 35 
days of the end of their quarter. The financial statements that are included in a 
quarterly report are generally unaudited.  
10-K - The annual report that is filed (yearly) by a company. This is an extremely 
in-depth document that contains everything relevant about the company; Executive 
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compensation, audited financial statements, organization structure, etc. 
8-K - A form that is filed by companies to inform their shareholders of "unscheduled 
material events that are important to shareholders"; CFO leaves, SEC is launching 
an investigation, the company announces a new business deal, delisting notice, 
shutting down a plant, layoffs, bankruptcy, etc. These are all material events that 
would require an 8-K to be filed. The 8-K is extremely common, and many 
companies will file a number of 8-K's throughout the course of a quarter.” 
 
8. Annex II 
 
Correlation table 
A _ M C EO.T D IP D IP_ PL D L Eco .D is EL EX IT EX IT_ PLF i.D is. Lq .ed Liqd t y Plans Post .L Post P. Prep . R EOR G. Size S.Em. T IM E
A _ M 1.00 -0.82 -0.02 -0.01 0.17 -0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.22 -0.11 -0.04 0.12 0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.83 -0.07 -0.05 0.18
C EO.T -0.82 1.00 0.03 0.08 -0.18 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.02 -0.18 -0.45 0.06 -0.13 -0.07 0.09 0.03 0.98 0.06 0.52 -0.20
D IP -0.02 0.03 1.00 0.34 0.21 0.07 -0.12 0.13 0.05 -0.13 -0.03 0.13 -0.05 0.07 0.64 0.05 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.10
D IP_ PL -0.01 0.08 0.34 1.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.12 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.18 0.03 0.08 -0.04 0.15 -0.03
D L 0.17 -0.18 0.21 -0.01 1.00 -0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03 -0.11 0.06 0.42 0.01 0.73 0.13 -0.03 -0.19 -0.20 -0.09 0.04
Eco .D is -0.09 0.08 0.07 -0.01 -0.07 1.00 0.02 0.13 0.08 -0.07 0.00 0.08 -0.09 -0.03 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.03
EL -0.02 0.09 -0.12 -0.01 0.04 0.02 1.00 0.41 0.09 0.05 -0.13 0.08 0.03 0.71 0.20 -0.04 0.09 -0.28 0.09 -0.07
EX IT 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.41 1.00 0.34 0.02 -0.32 -0.03 0.01 0.32 0.49 0.08 0.16 -0.04 0.33 0.02
EX IT_ PL 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.34 1.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06
F i.D is. 0.22 -0.18 -0.13 -0.03 -0.11 -0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.06 1.00 -0.03 -0.30 0.14 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.18 -0.03 0.01 -0.08
Lq .ed -0.11 -0.45 -0.03 -0.12 0.06 0.00 -0.13 -0.32 -0.06 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.14 -0.05 -0.46 -0.01 -0.87 0.07
Liqdt y -0.04 0.06 0.13 -0.09 0.42 0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.30 -0.04 1.00 -0.01 0.35 0.13 -0.03 0.06 -0.15 0.04 0.00
Plans 0.12 -0.13 -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.09 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.14 0.04 -0.01 1.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.13 0.06 -0.05 0.23
Post .L 0.11 -0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.73 -0.03 0.71 0.32 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.35 0.03 1.00 0.23 -0.05 -0.07 -0.33 0.00 -0.02
Post P. -0.02 0.09 0.64 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.20 0.49 0.13 -0.02 -0.14 0.13 0.02 0.23 1.00 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.16 0.07
Prep . 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.04 1.00 0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.19
R EOR G. -0.83 0.98 0.04 0.08 -0.19 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.01 -0.18 -0.46 0.06 -0.13 -0.07 0.10 0.03 1.00 0.07 0.53 -0.20
Size -0.07 0.06 0.19 -0.04 -0.20 0.09 -0.28 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.15 0.06 -0.33 0.02 0.00 0.07 1.00 0.10 0.08
S.Em. -0.05 0.52 0.04 0.15 -0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.33 0.03 0.01 -0.87 0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.53 0.10 1.00 -0.14
T IM E 0.18 -0.20 0.10 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 0.06 -0.08 0.07 0.00 0.23 -0.02 0.07 -0.19 -0.20 0.08 -0.14 1.00
 
Note: Correlations above 0.50 in absolute value are highlighted in light blue 
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